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South Tyrol -  An economic or political 
success story?
An investigation of the factors contributing to the solution 
of an ethnic-national conflict1
1. Introduction
It is a well-known and plausible thesis that social conflicts in general and ethnic 
tensions in particular are correlated to the economic situation of a society: As long 
as there is strong economic growth, all groups can improve their situation without 
the necessity of re-distribution and the corresponding fights between social groups. 
In the case of South Tyrol, this thesis seems quite evident: During the Fifties and 
Sixties of the last century, the economic situation was not good -  forcing many 
German-speaking young people to emigrate to foreign (mostly German-speaking) 
countries (Widmann 1998). Since the Nineties, however, South Tyrol is among the 
most prosperous provinces not only of Italy, but of the whole European Union. 
Corresponding to this, ethnic tensions were at their height in the Sixties, and have 
decreased since that time so that today it can be said that this conflict has more 
or less been solved. Today, South Tyrol is considered as a positive example of the 
successful solution of an ethnic conflict. From the viewpoint of many other violent 
ethnic-national conflicts, which persist even in Western Europe since decades, this 
is a remarkable achievement.
Yet, I would like to argue in this contribution, that the thesis of a determination 
of ethnic and national conflicts by the economic situation alone would be too sim­
ple. This has already been proven for violent class conflicts which are even more 
directly concerned about economic growth and redistribution: Often in history the 
most strong conflicts and even revolutions broke out not in phases of economic 
stagnation or decline but in phases of growth and prosperity. It is also a matter of 
fact that ethnic and national movements often develop most forcefully in those 
regions of a country which are rather well-developed and privileged; Yugoslavia 
was only the last historical example proving this fact The initators of its dissolution 
were the well-off republics Slovenia and Croatia, but not the poor republics and 
provinces of Bosnia-Herzegowina, Macedonia or Kosovo. Thus, there must exist 
also other important determinants of ethnic-national tensions besides of economic 
decline and deprivation of an ethnic-national group or region. Here, I will try to 
show that they in fact have played a significant role in the case of South Tyrol.
Let me first develop some concrete hypotheses in this regard. These hypo­
theses refers to the economic, social, cultural and political determinants o f  eth­
nic-national conflicts; the last, more general hypothesis, however, concerns the
131
long-term relationships between ethnic-national tensions, economic growth and 
societal development.
2. Five hypotheses on determinants of ethnic and national 
tensions and conflicts
The following four hypotheses refer to the determinants of ethnic-national ten­
sions. As suggested before, I start from the assumption that not only economic, but 
also social, cultural and political factors play a decisive role here.
Let us begin with the thesis discussed before, that ethnic-national conflicts will 
be closely related to the degree of economic prosperity of an ethnic group or a 
region. This hypothesis states:
Hypothesis la :
The general positive socioeconomic situation and development o f  an ethnic-national 
group and o f the region it inhabits will weaken ethnic tensions and contribute to a 
peaceful coexistence o f the different ethnic groups.
What is at issue in most ethnic-national conflicts, however, is not only the overall 
economic situation of the region but the relative socioeconomic position of the dif­
ferent ethnic groups. The American sociologist Peter M. Blau (1977; see also Haller 
1999:187ff.) has developed a few simple, but powerful sociological concepts which 
can be used to explain how social differentiation is related to relations between 
different social groups. He distinguishes between two kinds of differentiation: 
horizontal differentiation exists, if two groups distinguish themselves from each 
other by their kind of work or other criteria, but without a ranking order; vertical 
differentiation exists, if such an order or hierarchy between the groups exists. The 
differentiation between physicians and lawyers is example of the first kind, that 
between physicians and nurses an example of the second kind. Overall peaceful 
and productive societal integration is best secured, if a society is differentiated in 
a manifold way, that is, if the different forms of social differentiation -  gender dif­
ferentiation, occupational differentiation, ethnic differentiation and so forth -  do 
not coincide but are relatively independent of each other; this situation is called 
multiform heterogeneity. If the different social groups in a society are distinguished 
from each other not only in horizontal terms, but if these differences coincide with 
differences in occupational privileges, income, political influence and so forth, 
a situation of a consolidated social structure obtains. This means, that a group is 
distinguished from other groups not only by one, but by several criteria, some of 
which indicate a clear situation of discrimination or privilege. Such was the case in 
former Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, and it contributed strongly to the down- 
break of these multinational states. The Slovenes and Croats were distinguished 
from the peoples of the other Yugoslav republics not only in terms of ethnic origin 
and religion and -  as in Slovenia -  also of language, but also in terms of the pro­
ductivity of their economies, the mean income, and political influence. Contrary
to this explosive situation of a consolidated social structure, we can observe a situ­
ation of multiform heterogeneity in Switzerland, where political borders between 
the cantons, and the membership in different religious denominations, language 
groups etc. do not coincide.
Using these concepts, we can formulate the following hypothesis for the case of 
South Tyrol:
Hypothesis lb:
Ethnic-national tensions in South Tyrol became most intense and acute in a period 
when there was a tendency toward a consolidated socio-economic structure, and these 
tensions were weakening when a heterogeneous social structure began to develop, 
including a complex situation o f  privilege and discrimination o f the different groups. 
Tensions became particularly intense in the periods when the transition from  one 
situation to the other was clearly felt by the population.
A second set of factors relevant for peaceful or conflict-ridden relationships 
between different ethnic groups refers to social factors proper. Here, I start from 
the assumption that in any ethnic-national conflict, the issue of social recognition 
by others plays a crucial role. Often, it is not pure economic interests which lie 
behind long-range and embittered conflicts and fights, but the feeling of a group 
that it is not recognized in its self-worth adequately by the others. This feeling, 
evidently, presupposes that a group possesses a relatively clear self-concept or iden­
tity. On this background, experienced trade union leaders can say that no labour 
fight has been for nothing; if it did not achieve to the goals aimed at, it did in 
any case lead toward a strengthening of the feeling of belonging together, of „class 
consciousness“ of the workers. The extreme form of negation of the identity of a 
minority group occurs if the dominant groups denies his right of existence. But 
also less extreme forms, such as its more or less open deprivation of fundamental 
economic, social and political rights, are significant.
Concerning the case of South Tyrol, we can formulate the following hypothesis 
in this regard:
Hypothesis 2a:
Ethnic tensions in South Tyrol were most intense in periods when the fundamental 
social, economic and cultural rights o f  the population were not recognized by the 
majority, in this case the state o f  Italy. This was the case during the period o f  fascism  
(1922-1943), but -  to a lesser degree -  also in the first decade after Second World 
War. (In the first period, the conflicts could not break out openly due the totalitarian 
political system). In the decades since the early Seventies a significant improvement 
in this regard took place, as fa r  as the recognition o f  the German and Rdtoroman 
linguistic groups is concerned. The situation o f  the Italian speaking group, however, 
was more difficult from  the beginning due a lack o f identity o f this group given its 
heteregeneous composition in terms o f regional origin. It became even worse in the 
course o f the Sixties and Seventies when the granting o f  political autonomy to South 
Tyrol brought them into a situation o f  a minority within the province.
There is a further factor which, in my opinion, is highly relevant for the forms how 
ethnic relations are developing in a region, namely the role of individual political 
personalities. It is usually argued that the role of individuals is a topic to be con­
sidered only by biographers, historians and “idiographic sciences” in general, but 
not by the social sciences which should focus instead on structural determinants 
of events. This is a grave error, in my opinion. By neglecting the decisive role which 
outstanding individual personalities can play in history, the social sciences neglect 
one of the most significant factors (Haller 1996). I would argue that if a personality 
like Slobodan Milosevic would have taken over power in the Soviet Union, but 
one like Mikhail Gorbachev in Yugoslavia, we would have seen a bloodshet in the 
former country, while the latter would still exist!2 The consideration of the role of 
individual personalities by the social sciences must, however, be carried out from 
a generalizing, ideal-typical point of view as it was sketched by Max Weber (see 
Haller 1999). We have to ask, how structural circumstances concide, so to speak, 
with specific characteristics, strategies and actions of political personalities.
Out of these considerations, my next hypothesis reads as follows:
Hypothesis 2b:
Outstanding political leaders have played a decisive role in the formulation o f ethnic- 
national concerns and in their successful and peaceful solution during the Seventies 
and Eighties in South Tyrol. Other political leaders, however, have also contributed 
significantly to the delay o f the peaceful settlement o f the conflict in the first postwar 
decades.
A further set of factors that plays a decisive role in the peaceful settlement or in the 
escalation of ethnic-national conflicts is related to culture. Here, two aspects are 
relevant: First, the degree of cultural similarity or difference between the ethnic 
groups, second, the overall peacefulness or aggressiveness of a culture. Among 
different elements, religion still lies at the core also of present-day cultures. Reli­
gion is also of outstanding importance in ethnic-national conflicts: If the conflict­
ing groups belong to different religions, the conflict gets a kind of “transcendental 
aura”; it is possible to characterize all actions, even atrocities, as a divine right or 
even a duty to preserve ones own culture! As far as South Tyrol is concerned, the 
factor of religion is seldom mentioned even if it is and was in my opinion of decisive 
importance as well.3 This concerns both the aspect of the religious homogeneity of 
all ethnic subgroups, as well as the dimension of peacefulness or agressiveness of 
catholicism, the dominant religion in South Tyrol. In this regard, my hypothesis 
states the following effects:
Hypothesis 3:
From the viewpoint o f culture, the prospects fo r  a peaceful solution o f the ethnic con­
flict in South Tyrol have always been better than in many other situations o f  ethnic 
conflict in Europe and around the world. This was so fo r  two reasons:
(1) All three ethnic-national groups in South Tyrol, and also the dominant Italian 
state population belong to only one religious denomination, Roman catholicism;
the harsh working and living conditions in the Alps have favoured a rather high 
level o f traditional religiosity among its inhabitants;
(2) In its values and ideology concerning peacefulness or aggressiveness, Roman 
catholicism today can be considered as taking a middle position, as inclinging 
more to a peaceful settlement o f social conflicts than some other world religions.4
A final, but equally important determinant of ethnic-national conflicts concerns 
the political dimension itself. Here, I suppose that the political constitution of a 
nation state is of decisive importance (see Haller 1992 for a more extensive treat­
ment of this issue). The central element of the political constitution of a nation state 
that is relevant here concerns the degree of centralization or decentralization of 
a state; in the first case, we can speak of a centralized, in the latter of a federal con­
stitutional structure. In order to grasp the relevance of this distinction for ethnic- 
national conflicts, we can refer again to the concepts of multiform heterogeneity 
versus structural consolidation developed by P. M. Blau. It is only a federal struc­
ture which allows that multiform heterogeneity develops in a state society. I have 
already mentioned the example of Switzerland: Here, the non-conincidence of lin­
guistic, religious and economic differentiations makes sure, that conflicts between, 
say, German and French speaking, or catholic and protestant groups or cantons 
cannot develop, since the persons living in the German-speaking canton of Zürich, 
for instance, are divided in religious, socioeconomic aspects and so forth.
The effects of political centralisation on the situation of ethnic minorities have 
two sides. On the one side, a centralized state tries to create equal conditions of life 
in all parts of the country and for all societal groups. This was the great aim of one 
of the first nation states in the world, the French Republic after the revolution of 
1789. On the other side, a centralized nation state aims also at creating a unified, 
homogeneous culture. This means often that ethnic minorities and their peculiari­
ties in linguistic terms etc. are not considered as being a cultural asset, but have to 
be eliminated in order to create and preserve national unity. So, political centraliza­
tion often creates a tension between the central state and the aim of ethnic-national 
minorities to preserve their specific languages and cultures.5
As far as South Tyrol is concerned, this issue has doubtless had a great signifi­
cance. I propose the following two hypotheses in this regard:
Hypothesis 4:
(1) The relative high level o f political centralization o f the constitution o f the state o f 
Italy has contributed to an intensification o f  ethnic-national tensions in South 
Tyrol up to the Seventies o f  the Twentieth Century; the tendency to grant more 
autonomy to regional sub-units since then, however, has contributed to an easing 
o f these tensions.
(2) The creation o f the European Union will further contribute to an easing o f eth­
nic-national conflicts in South Tyrol, since the nation states loose some o f  their 
powers, but the overall level o f  the Union, as well as the level o f regional units, will 
gain in importance and autonomy.
These are my specific hypotheses concerning the intensification of weaking or eth­
nic-national tensions and conflicts in South Tyrol. Altogether, they suggest that 
the ethnic conflict will have been weakened in South Tyrol over the last decades. 
In the long term, however, we must also look at this problematic from a broader 
perspective. Ethnic-national conflicts, a peaceful living together of ethnic groups, 
are not only dependent variables, but are themselves significant determinants of 
developments in all other societal sectors. In a situation of protracted and violent 
ethnic conflict, an economy cannot flourish and the partners involved in the con­
flict develop new, specific interests which require a perpetuation of the conflict.6 
Also a peaceful living together has a self-enforcing tendency: Economic actors, 
social groups, civic and political associations and their leaders all profit from a 
preservation of a stable and calculable social and political environment. In this 
regard, I propose the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5:
The peaceful settlement o f an ethnic-national conflict deepens the trust between the 
different socioeconomic groups, as well as between the minority groups and the state 
authorities. As a consequence, economic activities can grow and develop much better 
than in a situation o f continuing conflict. This has happened in the last decades also 
in South Tyrol: The peaceful settlement o f  the ethnic conflict has itself contributed 
significantly to economic growth and prosperity and to a dynamic population develop­
ment in this region.
3. Socioeconomic changes and ethnic conflicts in 
South Tyrol, 1945-2000
There are two aspects of the socioeconomic situation and their change which are 
relevant for the outbreak of ethnic-national conflicts and tensions: One is the over­
all economic situation of a group, the other is its internal socioeconomic struc­
ture in the sense of its differentiation or consolidation. Let us discuss one after the 
other.
Economic development and the changing level of 
ethnic-national tensions
As a test of our first hypothesis -  that a positive socioeconomic development leads 
to a decrease of ethnic-national tensions and conflicts -  let us look at the develop­
ment of the economic situation and the intensity of ethnic conflicts in South Tyrol 
since World War II. As a first approximation, a schematic overview is presented on 
the relationship between the two processes in Synopsis l.7 (See also the stylized 
graphic summary of the relation between the two processes in Obkircher 1999, 
p. 159). As we can see from these overview, it is rather clear that there existed a 
close correlation between the development of the overall economic situation and
the intensity of ethnic-national tensions in South Tyrol. Let us discuss shortly the 
main phases of the time period under consideration.8
Synopsis 1: A schematic overview on the relations between socioeconomic develop­
ment, significant political events and ethnic tensions in South Tyrol, 1945-2000
Period Economic situation Political events Ethnic tensions
1945-59 Reconstruction 
after war 
Transition from 
agrarian to 
industrial society 
Employment crisis 
of and labour 
emigration of 
young, German 
speaking
1946 Gruber- 
Degasperi treaty, 
Paris
1947 South Tyrol 
autonomous, but 
united with Trento 
1957:
Sigmundskron
demonstration
1956-69: First 
series of bomb 
attacks
1961 “Fire Night”
1960-84 Economic 
prosperity (South 
Tyrolean „economic 
miracle“)
Establishment of 
the commission of 
the 19
1972 Second 
autonomy statute: 
Province of
1984-88 Economic crisis Bozen/South Tyrol 
becomes fully 
autonomous 
1988 L. Durnwalder 
head of local 
government
1987-88 Second 
stage of terrorism of 
bomb attacks
1990- Economic recovery 
and prosperity, 
massive financial 
transfers;
from the state to the 
province Bolzano
Establishment of 
the commission of 
the 137
Detailed autonomy 
regulations 1992 
1992 Austrian 
parliament and 
government declare 
the conflict as 
solved
In the aftermath of Second World War, South Tyrolean economy had to adapt to the 
new circumstances which meant -  in the Fifties and Sixties -  an accelerated transi­
tion to the industrial and post-industrial economy; as elsewhere in Central Europe, 
this process had been slowed down considerably by war. For Tyrol, this process 
involved a strong exodus from the rural villages, where birth rates were high but 
employment opportunities restricted and even decreasing due to the progress of
technical equipment available for farm work also in mountain rural areas and due 
to an increasing specialisation of the farms.9 Given the fact, that in South Tyrol 
at this time the only large-scale industry was that established by the Fascists in 
Bozen, and public service was nearly exclusively in the hands of the Italian-speak­
ing population, there was a rather strong shortage of industrial (and service) work­
ing places so that about 7.000 young German speaking youth from rural areas had 
to emigrate; most of them emigrated to the adjacent German speaking countries, 
Austria, Germany and Switzerland.10 At the same time, post-fascist Italy contin­
ued the policy of settling immigrant Italian workers in Bolzano, by enlarging the 
heavy industrial plants in Bozen and by providing publicly financed apartments 
for their workers recruited from other Italian provinces (Widmann 1998). As a 
consequence of these measures, a process of hidden immigration of Italians to the 
province of Bozen took place. In the decade between 1946 and 1955, about 26.000 
Italians “immigrated” to South Tyrol; even if about 18.000 others left the prov­
ince in the same time, a net positive immigration took place which increased the 
local Italian population by about 10.000 persons (Obkircher 199, p. 20). The conse­
quence was that among the German-speaking South Tyroleans, an increasing dis­
pleasure and unrest was spreading, culminating in the parole of the “Death March” 
of the (German-speaking) South Tyroleans.11 This parole meant that the industrial 
and population policy of post-war Italy in the long-term would have the same con­
sequence of that of fascism, namely to make the German-speaking population of 
South Tyrol a minority in its own inherited territorium. The culmination of unrest 
among the German speaking South Tyroleans was the “Fire Night” when in the 
night of 11./12. June 1961 -  the day of the “Heart of Jesus”, the patron of South 
Tyrol -  during several hours dozens of pylons of power lines around Bolzano and 
in other places were blast -  filling the whole valley basin of Bozen for hours with 
a horrific crash. This outbreak of ethnic violence shaked up whole Italy, leading to 
an image of South Tyrol as a terroristic region, an enemy of the state, which soon 
was filled with about 45.000 soldiers and policemen from all over Italy (Widmann 
1998:580). They controlled fiercely public buildings, the borders to Austria and any 
suspicious person and group in the province, and treated very harshly (even tortur­
ing some of them) all those South Tyroleans who were convicted of participation 
in the terrorist attacks.
The following decades, however, brought a positive turn in socio-economic 
and political development. First, the leading political party of South Tyroleans, 
the Siidtiroler Volkspartei, changed its economic and industrial policy which up 
to now was characterized by a rather defensive stance against the establishment of 
industrial plants. (It was feared that the development of such plants would mainly 
attract Italian workers from other provinces). It began to support the decentralized 
establishment of small and medium-sized handicrafts and industries, whereby 
possibilities for work could be created in smaller towns and larger rural com­
munes without the necessity of a strong urbanisation. In this way, and also due to 
a strong development of tourism (fostered on its side by rising incomes in Austria, 
Germany, but also South Tyrol itself), South Tyrolean economy recovered in the 
Seventies and began to develop in a very dynamic way. Also agriculture profited
from the rising demand of the towns and the tourism services and could withstand 
a decline which could be observed in many other Alpine regions.
Second, as a political consequence of the outburst of ethnic violence, the Ital­
ian government was ready to enter into serious negotiations with the German­
speaking South Tyroleans about their demand for local provincial autonomy -  a 
demand which was strongly supported by Austria and its then foreign minister 
Bruno Kreisky. He brought the South Tyrolean issue -  against strong resistance 
from the side of Italy -  before the forum of the United Nations. So, in 1972 the 
second Statute of Autonomy12 could be passed which gave many important rights 
to the local parliament and government of South Tyrol, now independent from the 
formerly autonomus region Trentino-Alto Adige.
The situation of the two larger linguistic groups now began to change funda­
mentally. The obligation of the statute of autonomy foresaw that all public jobs and 
public apartments were distributed between the three languistic groups (German, 
Italian and Ratoroman speaking) in the same proportions as their proportions 
among the populations were. Since the political autonomy of South Tyrol gave to 
the province the control of a wide range of areas, and provided it with an increasing 
income from central state funds, this meant particularly for the German speaking 
population thousands of new jobs in public administration and semipublic enter­
prises (such as postal services, railways etc.). For the Italian speaking population, 
however, the statute meant a significant deterioration of their hitherto privileged 
position. In addition, the Eighties brought with them an economic recession which 
led to an increase of unemployment by which the Italian speaking population, con­
centrated in larger industrial plants and in the provincial capital of Bozen/Bol­
zano, was hit considerably stronger than the other two groups. Correlated with this 
trend, the neofascist party MSI became the strongest party in the elections dur­
ing the Eighties in Bozen/Bolzano, and a new series of terristic attacks broke out, 
probably originating from extremist right-wing Italian groups. Thus, while ethnic 
conflicts and attacks of the first period were directed against the central state, now 
the ethnic conflict became more of an internal affair, directed from the “new” Ital­
ian speaking minority within South Tyrol against the German speaking majority. 
The late 1980ies and early 1990ies brought again an easing of ethnic tension. This 
was due, first, to an increasing improvement of the economic situation which led 
to practical full employment till the end of the century and, second, to an increas­
ing recognition from the side of the Italian speaking population and their political 
leaders that the political autonomy of the province became also an advantage for 
them.13
Table 1: Population development in South Tyrol, (1910-) 1953-1991, by ethnic- 
linguistic groups
Year German
Speakers
Rätoroman
speakers
Italian
speakers
Total (Absolute
numbers)
1910 % 93,0 4,1 2,9 100 (237.825)
1921 % 83,9 4,3 11,7 99,9 (230.229)
1953% 62,7 3,7 33,6 100 (341.521)
1961 % 62,2 3,4 34,3 99,9 (373.581)
1971 % 62,9 3,7 33,3 99,9 (413.566)
1981 % 64,9 4,1 28,7 99,7 (430.568)
1991 % 68,0* 4,4* 27,6* 100 (440.508)
2001 % 69,4 4,3 26,3 100 (462.999)
Changes between (in %)
1953-61 + 8,6 -0,8 +11,0 + 9,3
1961-71 +11,9 +22,7 + 7,4 +10,7
1971-81 + 7,3 +14,7 -10,3 + 4,1
1981-91 + 4,0 + 6,0 -4,6 + 2,3
1991-01 + 3,1 + 1,6 -3,0 + 5,1
Source: Population Censuses; ASTAT, Statistische Jahrbücher fiir Südtirol (annually); for 1991: 
ASTAT, 13. Allgemeine Volkszählung 1991, Bozen 1995, pp. 49, 73; for 2001: Statistisches Jahr­
buch für Südtirol 203, p. 112-113.
Figures refer to the resident population (Wohnbevölkerung/popolazione residente)
* Without 12.910 persons who did not declare their belonging to one o f the three linguistic 
groups.
If we look at the figures on the demographic development of the three linguistic 
groups over the postwar period, we can see these tendencies rather clearly. In the 
Fifties and Sixties, the size of the Italian speaking group increased both in absolute 
and in relative terms (in absolute numbers from 114.000 to 137.000). In the Seven­
ties, however, a fundamental change took place: The first group decreased by 
not less than 10% (by about 15.000 in absolute numbers), while the German and 
Raetoroman groups could increase both their absolute numbers and proportions 
considerably.
Social structural consolidation and re-differentiation
As outlined in hypothesis lb, there is a second aspect of socio-economic develop­
ment which is an important determinant of the relations between ethnic groups, 
namely, the degree of consolidation or differentiation of the social and economic 
structure of a population or region. The more differentiated the different ethnic 
groups are in terms of education, occupational concentration, territorial disper­
sion and so on, the less probable is it that they feel contraposed to each other; the
less this is the case, and the more one-sided the economic and social structure of a 
group, the more it will feel that it has not only a specific identity, but also an incom­
plete and problematic social structure.
The latter situation was existing to a large degree among the ethnic groups in 
South Tyrol after Second World War. Two processes had contributed to this fact. 
One was the consequence of the “Option”; In this time, the German speaking 
South Tyroleans in the years 1939-43 were constrained to decide if they wanted 
to remain (to “opt” for) in Italy or to leave South Tyrol for other provinces in 
the “Reich” of Hitler. In this way, the two dictators, Hitler and Mussolini, wanted 
to “solve” the ethnic problem in South Tyrol once and forever. The persons, who 
left South Tyrol were mainly workers and employees, while most of the farmers 
remained in the country. The other fact was the huge immigration of Italians from 
other provinces to South Tyrol. Before First World War, South Tyrol in its present 
territorium had only a tiny minority of 3% Italian speaking persons (see Table
1). The immigration in the Twenties and Thirties, however, created a very one­
sided socio-economic structure among the Italian group. Since immigration was 
mainly initiated by the massive industrialisation program in Bozen by the fascists, 
the immigrants worked mainly in the large-scale industry on the one side, and in 
public and semi-public services (such as the state railway, the post offices and the 
like) on the other side. Therefore, after Second World War, the German (including 
the Raetoroman) and the Italian populations in South Tyrol were nearly living in 
two different worlds: The first in the smaller towns and villages, many of them in 
rural areas, the latter living mainly in Bozen (and here, in the town district of Gries 
which became practically an Italian subtown) and a few other cities and places 
(including communes like Brenner and Franzensfeste were many public jobs were 
available). Connected with the different occupational and living concentration, 
the education of the Italian speaking population was considerably higher than that 
of the German and Raetoroman speaking population.
Table 2 shows some basic data on the occupational-sectoral distribution of the 
three ethnic-linguistic groups from 1961 to 1997.14 In the early Sixties, it is evi­
dent that the German speaking population is concentrated massively in agriculture 
(about 45% were working there); the next largest group is people working in small 
handicraft and service enterprises. Contrary to them, the Italian speaking popula­
tion was concentrated in large industry and services and in the public services; 
here, around one fifth of all Italians in South Tyrol were employed. But already in 
1971, the proportion of Germans in agriculture becoming is much smaller (about 
30%), that in industry and services increased considerably; among the Italians, the 
proportion of those in private services increased, that in public services decreased. 
In the late Eighties and Nineties, the situation again looks very different. Farming 
is now a job for only a minority of the Germans (about 15%), but services have 
gained considerably; among Italians, the main trend is from (large scale) industry 
to services. Most remarkable is the fact that the proportion of persons in public 
services now is rather equal among the German and Italian speaking groups (23 
versus 27%). This fact clearly reflects the opening of the public and semi-public
state services for the German speaking population, and the massive increase of 
public jobs in the autonomous provincial government in Bozen.
Table 2: The occupational-sectoral distribution of the active population in South 
Tyrol by ethnic-linguistic groups, 1961-1997
1961 1971
German
speakers
%
Raetoroman
speakers
%
Italian
speakers
%
German
speakers
%
Raetoroman
speakers
%
Italian
speakers
%
Agriculture 44,8 37,9 4,2 29,9 20,6 2,7
Industry 20,9 33,5 40,6 26,9 29,3 36,6
Handcrafts,
private
services
30,8 25,3 34,9 39,9 46,4 44,1
Public
services
3,5 3,3 20,3 3,3 3,7 16,6
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
(N) (99.626) (5.426) (54.959) (95.705) (5.511) (52.605)
1986 1997
German
speakers
%
Italian
speaker
%
German
speakers
%
Italian
speakers
%
Self-employed farmers 15,9 2,1 Agriculture 15 1
Other self-employed 21,5 23,6 Industry, crafts 24 14
Blue-collar workers 34,9 29,2 Trade, traffic, 
tourism
32 34
Private Employees 12,5 17,4 Other services 29 51
Public employees 5,2 27,0 (Public service) (23) (27)
Total 100 100 100 100
(N) (478) (222) (432) (187)
Sources: 1961, 1971: Census results, as quoted in Obkircher 1998, p. 37; 1986: Social Survey 
1986 (ASTAT1988, p. 183); 1997: Social Survey 1997 (ASTAT2000, p. 19).
Let us come to a conclusion concerning the relation between socioeconomic 
development and ethnic tensions in South Tyrol since World War II. In the afore­
mentioned diploma thesis, Raimund Obkircher (1999, p. 159) has given a nice 
schematic-stylized interpretation of the relation between economic development 
and ethnic tensions in South Tyrol 1945-1999. As sketched out in my overview, 
economic growth and prosperity or crisis on the one side and ethnic tensions on 
the other side were in fact closely correlated with each other. In both phases when 
serious economic problems emerged -  from the mid-Fifties till the late Sixties, and 
again during the Eighties -  also ethnic tensions increased. Yet, I would doubt a
little bit the suggestion that there existed a direct causal connection between the two 
processes. First, it seems to me that in economic terms the situation in South Tyrol 
has never become so bad as it is depicted in the graph. Even in the late Eighties, 
when unemployment with about 5% was highest in South Tyrol, it never reached 
the level of the adjacent Italian provinces (7-8%) or of Italy as a whole (12%; see 
Obkircher 1999, p. 115). Second, I think that the outburst of ethnic violence of the 
early Sixties cannot be equated simply with the terrorist attacks of the Eighties. 
The former in some way can be considered as a true mass-based, ethnic-national 
uprising, involving dozens, if not hundreds of men, many of them idealistic and 
from simple, farm origins. The bomb attacks of the Seventies and Eighties, how­
ever, were carried through by “professional terrorists” as they operate since decades 
in Northern Ireland or the Bask country. A significant difference between the two 
is the fact that the first wave of attacks was directed only against material infra­
structure and symbolic objects (such as monuments of fascist and other Italian 
personalities, power lines etc.), but in the second also against persons.
4. From suppression and granting of pure existence to 
full recognition. The relevance of social factors and 
political personalities
Economic problems and unemployment, or a one-sided socio-economic distribu­
tion (exhibiting the characteristics of a “consolidated social structure”) alone could 
never explain the violent outburst of ethnic conflicts in South Tyrol in the late Fif­
ties, early Sixties. There are many regions and groups in Europe which experience 
a sharp economic and demographic decline; there are also groups who are strongly 
concentrated in specific areas of work, geographic territories, but do not resort to 
political violence to improve their lot. Even in the case of South Tyrol in the late 
Fifties, political unrest and violence was -  at least in the long run -  no necessary or 
unavoidable reaction to improve the economic situation. It is true -  as Italian gov­
ernments of the time stated again and again -  that the German speaking minority 
in South Tyrol had some degree of autonomy, that the preservation of its language 
was not in direct threat although its use in public spaces was inhibited. Access to 
public services was not wholly impossible for German speaking South Tyroleans. 
It might supposed that many young South Tyroleans emigrated to Austria, Ger­
many and Switzerland not primarily because of a lack of job opportunities in South 
Tyrol, but mainly because the wages paid by public and semi-public enterprises 
(such as the postal and railway services) in Italy were lower than those they could 
get in private enterprises in Germany and other prosperous countries that badly 
needed manpower. Moreover, the getting up of the economic miracle in Germany 
and the strong increase of tourism sooner or later would have contributed to the 
solution of the problems of employment in South Tyrol. Thus, we have to look for 
some other or at least some additional reasons for the outbreak of violent ethnic 
conflicts in South Tyrol in the early 1960ies.
These reasons, in my opinion, must clearly be sought in the lack of recognition 
of the German speaking minority in South Tyrol as a distinct sociocultural group 
of its own. This is one of the main necessities of social life of any individual and 
social group: To be recognized by other groups in society, and in particular by the 
dominant groups and the state, as having ones own identity, and full rights not only 
of existence, but of developing one’s own ways of life, one’s culture and so forth.
In 1946, the famous Gruber-Degasperi treaty was signed by the foreign ministers 
of Austria and Italy in Paris, foreseeing for the province of Trentino-Siidtirol con­
siderable political and cultural autonomy (Steurer 1998). Yet, from the viewpoint 
of the German speaking South Tyroleans, this contract soon turned out as being a 
Trojan horse: South Tyrol was united with the province of Trento in an autonomous 
region. In the region with about 730.000 inhabitants, the Italian speaking popula­
tion had a clear majority (210.000 German speaking South Tyroleans compared 
to 520.000 Italians in the provinces of Trento and Bolzano/Bozen). The German 
speaking representatives in the regional parliament in Trento, however, were always 
in a minority; they had only 15 deputies compared with 48 deputies of the Italian 
speaking group (Widmann 1998:10). Even this fact per se would not have made 
unavoidable the outbreak of an ethnic conflict. It would have well been possible 
that the Italian speaking majority had respected the rights of the German speaking 
South Tyroleans in their specific concerns. Yet, this was not the case and it is here, 
that the role of individual political personalities comes in. From the viewpoint of 
a state population, political elites and leaders play a crucial role: The legitimacy 
of an existing political system rests to a large degree on the individual personali­
ties that represent that system. A highly respected leader can provide invaluable 
symbolic legitimacy and emotional support to a whole political system;15 a leader 
who is not respected, or even feared by his subject citizens, can induce massive 
political unrest, and even revolutionary turmoils. It is my thesis that both such 
types of leading political personalities have played crucial roles in the post-war his­
tory of South Tyrol, both in escalating the ethnic-national conflict, and in its final 
solution in the new autonomy granted to the province of South Tyrol alone. Due 
to reasons of time, I can only provide here a very short sketch of two important 
political actors.
One of the decisive political actors at the side of Italy was the head of the Italian 
government in 1945-1953, Alcide Degasperi. This politician, originating from 
a catholic family in Trentino, was already a deputy in the Austrian Reichstag in 
Vienna during the last years of the monarchy. After First World War, he founded the 
Italian catholic Peoples Party, and, after the Second World War, the long-governing 
party Democrazia Cristiana. As head of the Italian government, he was one of the 
most important West European leaders asking for a uniting of Europe, and was 
decorated with the Aachener Karlspreis in 1952. There are some other sides of this 
highly respected European political leader as well, however. One were his doubt­
ful methods of excluding the communists from the government and of securing 
his own re-election.16 The other aspect, which is of interest here, is his position 
concerning the granting of full political and cultural autonomy to the German 
speaking minority in South Tyrol. There is no doubt that he was a strong opponent
of such an autonomy. It was his government, which in 1948 included article 117 in 
the new constitution of the Italian Republic which extended the political autonomy 
for the South Tyroleans, negotiated by in the Gruber-Degasperi treaty of Paris, to 
the whole region Trentino-Alto Adige/South Tyrol (Widmann 1998:55). This was 
no accident. Already in 1921» Degasperi had approved Mussolini’s aim of italianis- 
ing the province of Bozen. After Second World War, as Italian’s prime minister, 
he did all that he could do to define the case of the German speaking minority in 
South Tyrol as a pure internal problem of Italy. He convinced British and Ameri­
can governments -  which favoured a referendum about the remaining of South 
Tyrol with Italy or its return to Austria -  that the political and cultural autonomy 
of the province was secured, and that the Italian speaking majority of the province 
did not lack any rights. In a recent, informative book on the post-war history of 
South Tyrol, Franz Widmann (1998:203) has characterized Degasperi (his judge­
ment has surely been one-sided somewhat since he was one of the new genera­
tion of politicians around Magnago who fighted for the aim “Off from Trento”) 
as a person with two souls in his breast: Being an autonomist in the times of the 
Austro-Hungarian monarchy, he soon turned into an Italian and Trentino-Irren- 
dentist who had an old antipathy against the German speaking South Tyroleans 
and was happy that the old political unit of Tyrol had been broken down after 
First World War. Such a stance is rather surprising from the view of a person who 
fighted in the monarchy for the granting of political autonomy to the then Italian­
speaking minority of Trento17 within the large Bundeslartd Tirol. He must have 
known the facts much better than any other Italian politician outside the region 
and province. In his memoranda for the foreign ministers, Degasperi denigrated 
the South Tyroleans as strong supporters of National Socialism before and during 
World War II in order to support his arguments. Thus, the position and actions 
of this highly influential political top leader of Italy paved the way for the stance 
and behaviour of many other leading Italian politicians of the time, including later 
premiers and foreign ministers. Among them were local political leaders, such as 
the longstanding head of the regional government of Trentino-Alto Adige, Tullio 
Odorizzi, a fanatic fighter against an autonomy for South Tyrol, not to speak of the 
neofascist leaders of the MSI of the province of Bolzano, like Andrea Mitolo and 
others.
The history of the negotiations between the central Roman authorities and the 
governments of the region Trentino-Alto Adige on the one side, and the leaders 
of the German speaking South Tyroleans on the other side from 1945 till the early 
Sixties is full of reports about harsh disappointments of the latter. Their relatively 
moderate aims of gaining basic political autonomy for the province -  such as the 
control of immigration, the use of German in public offices and services, public 
housing etc. -  were obstructed in all possible ways. This series of disappointments 
strongly contributed to the rise of an unrest, embitterment and anger which led 
even many foreign commentators in respected newspapers (such the Neue Zurcher 
Zeitung, the Frankfurter Allgemeine and others), to warn before a violent outbreak 
of the ethnic tensions in South Tyrol in the late Fifties. In some regards it was 
certainly the economic situation, and the fact that South Tyroleans could not take
their full part in public services, public housing programs etc. which led to their 
unrest. This unrest was stirred up, however, in large measure also by the behaviour 
of the Italian politicians which strongly deepened mistrust against their fellow 
politicians among the German speaking minority.
In such a situation, South Tyrolean politicians had an extremely difficult time 
and even more so after the outbreak of violence from the late Fifties on. On the one 
side, they could not take a very radical position against the central state authori­
ties since this would have provided these with ammunition for accusing them of 
state-threating secession attempts. On the other side, they had to consider the deep 
feelings of unrest among their own German speaking South Tyrolean population. 
The drama of postwar South Tyrolean politics, in this regard, includes also a fight 
within the political elites and representatives of the German speaking minority 
itself. The first group of leaders of the Siidtiroler Volkspartei (SVP) -  men like 
Otto von Guggenberg, Karl Tinzl, Erich Amonn and others -  followed a kind of 
“appeasement politics.” They accepted the existing situation -  the autonomy for 
the whole province -  but tried to achieve many small improvements by continuous 
negotiations. Since the failure of this kind of politics became more and more evi­
dent, a new group of more determinate political leaders formed itself, and came to 
power in the General Assembly of the SVP of 1957. This group included men like 
Alfons Benedikter, Hans Dietl, Friedl Volgger and others. The undisputed leader 
among them was “the men from Castelfirmiano” (Agostini 1986, p. 159fF.), Silvius 
Magnago, a person who had personal affiliations to all relevant groups: To the old 
Habsburg monarchy (his father was a public servant in the province of Trentino), 
to the Italians (his father was Italian speaking) and to the South Tyroleans (a Ger­
man speaking mother). His charisma was enforced by the fact that he had lost one 
of his legs in World War II and was an excellent and charismatic speaker. It was 
Magnago who combined in his person characteristics which were decisive in such 
a situation: To exude personal trustworthiness, but also self-consciousness and 
determination in the pursuing of the important political aims. At the same time 
he was thrustworthy also in the eyes of the political adversary, the Italian speaking 
population of Trentino-Alto Adige and the leading political elites of Italian govern­
ments in Rome. Magnago did not succeed in his aims from the beginning, but he 
had to fight for years within and outside his party. His virtues showed for the first 
time at the great demonstration at the castle of Sigmundskron in 1957, when about 
35.000 persons from all over South Tyrol proposed the parole “Offfrom Trento” 
(“Los von Trient”; rather than using this large assembly as a forum for a radical and 
much-applauded speech, Magnago made clear that his aim was clearly restricted 
as that of gaining political and cultural autonomy for the province of South Tyrol 
within the existing state borders. I think that the contemporary witness Franz 
Widmann (1998:411) is right when he states that without the “immense powers of 
self-assertion and the strong nerves” of this man the departure for the “Off from 
Trento” could have had quite a different, less happy end.
5. The relevance of catholic religion
Due to reasons of space, I can give only a few hints concerning the relevance of 
the factors mentioned in hypotheses 3 and 4, that is the dimensions of religion and 
political constitution.
As far as religion is concerned, it might seem that this factor did not play any 
role in the South Tyrolean conflict. My hypothesis was that there should have been 
no violent outbreak of conflicts at all in South Tyrol since all minority groups and 
the state belong to the common religion, Catholicism, and this religion cannot be 
accused of having a particular aggressive ideology. Yet, I would argue that religion 
did play an important role, even if this role was effective more in the background.
First, let us look at the role of some of the important political personalities 
discussed earlier. A case at first sight contrary to my hypothesis is that of Alcide 
Degasperi, the Trento-born leading Italian politician of the immediate post-war 
years. How can we understand the paradox fact that this highly religious personality 
played such an ambivalent or even negative role? Two times he founded the Italian 
catholic peoples party, and since some years, there has even a process of his beati­
fication been initiated -  but from the viewpoint of many German speaking South 
Tyroleans was seen as a traitor of their true and fundamental rights of political and 
cultural self-determination? I think we can understand this only by considering 
some other, less positive sides of catholic thinking and doctrines, namely, its con­
servative-patriarchal, in some regards even authoritarian character. So, the religious 
dogmatic teaching in catholicism is strongly controlled by central authorities in the 
Vatican, and the catholic church as a whole is characterized by a very clear, strong 
and rigid hierarchy. In both regards, protestantism might be considered as being 
much more “democratic” since it grants to the individual believers much more 
rights in interpreting the bible in its relevance for everyday life and in the responsi­
bility for gaining the eternal salvation. From this point of view, I think that it is no 
accidence that the oldest democracies of the Western world (England, United States 
of America) are protestant and that fascism in the Twenties of the last centuries first 
came to a breakthrough mainly in the Catholic countries of Europe, such as Italy, 
Austria, and Spain.18
Religion has doubtless played a significant role also for the South Tyroleans 
fighting for gaining more political and cultural autonomy. Their deep-rooted 
mistrust against the central Italian state authorities was based on the historical 
rememberance of the attempt of Italian fascism to eliminate any element of Ger­
man culture and language from South Tyrol. Such a brutal attempt could only be 
made by a fundamentally atheistic regime. In fact, fascism was -  even if it did 
not show openly this characteristic in the 99%-catholic Italy -  an ideology which 
could only have contempt for a code of ethics which prayed altruism, charity and 
trust in god, instead of the fascist principle of relying on violence and power and 
the Darwinian principle of the self-assertion and survival of the strongest. It is no 
accident, therefore, that the most decisive resistance against this attack came from 
catholic groups in South Tyrol, which the already mentioned Monsignore Michael 
Gamper as the leader.19 Also among the first wave of terrorists, the initiators of the
“Fire Night” of 1961, some of the leading personalities were strongly committed 
Catholics. We can mention here as an example Sepp Kerschbaumer, a quite reli­
gious farmer from Frangart (south of Bozen) who first worked actively within the 
SVP for a more radical stance against the state, then participated in the first round 
of terrorism and -  after his incarceration in the sequel of the “Feuernacht” -  died 
in prison.
A third factor which has to be considered in the role which religion played in 
the ethnic conflict in South Tyrol is the fact that the Italian speaking population of 
South Tyrol is composed rather heterogeneously in terms of regional origin. First, 
nearly 90% of the ancestors of them had been immigrated to the province only 
during the last century; even today, there is a considerable amount of immigra­
tion and emigration of Italians from the province of Bozen to other Italian prov­
inces,20 thus producing a relatively high level of demographic heterogeneity of this 
group. From this point of view, the Italians living in Bolzano and in other towns 
of South Tyrol today, have not been profoundly influenced by the “Alpine culture” 
(Demarchi 1968) which, to a certain degree, was common to both the German 
and Italian speaking populations of Tyrol and the Trentino. An indicator of this 
is the fact that the level of religiosity is much lower among the Italian speaking 
population of South Tyrol than among the German speaking, even controlling for 
the different regional concentration of the two groups (Haller 1988, p. 191). The 
relatively heterogeneous composition of the Italian speaking population of South 
Tyrol is also one of the factors which might explain their internal political divi­
sions; normally, many different parties get votes from the Italian speaking citizens, 
which is a high level of splitting compared with the high degree of closeness of the 
German speaking group where the SVP usually gets the largest share of all votes. 
This is a fact which was also quite important for understanding the success of the 
request for political autonomy.
6. Conclusions
Let us try to arrive at some general conclusions concerning the role of the different 
determinants of ethnic tensions and conflicts.
First, I hope that the general thesis proposed here has been made plausible, 
namely, that economic development and prosperity is an important determinant 
of the intensity of ethnic conflicts, but by far not the only one. In the case of South 
Tyrol, the ethnic conflict from the Sixties till the Eighties was to a large degree 
also a fight for the recognition of the fundamental rights of the German speaking 
minority, not only in terms of equal employment and housing opportunities, but 
also in terms of the full recognition of their language and culture. Also for the “new 
minority” of the Italian speaking population within South Tyrol from the Seven­
ties on, it was a “fight for existence” in the sense that they feared -  as the South 
Tyroleans did during Fascism and again in the late Fifties and early Sixties -  that 
they would be diminished strongly in demographic terms and reduced in political 
influence.
Table 3: Attitudes toward the living together of the ethnic-linguistic groups and 
toward the relevance of the political autonomy in South Tyrol by ethnic groups, 
1991 and 1997
1991
German
speakers
%
Italian
speakers
%
Raetoroman
speakers
%
The fact that in South Tyrol 
there exist several linguistic- 
ethnic groups is ...
... a cultural asset that must be 
estimated highly and has to be 
preserved in any case
32,4 39,3 65,1
... something which -  under 
specific conditions -  could 
represent a cultural asset
17,7 32,8 12,4
... a fact with which one must 
cope
41,2 9,3 14,2
... we all would live better with­
out this ethnic differentiation
8,7 18,6 8,4
1997
German
speakers
Italian
speakers
Raetoroman
speakers
% of positive answers
The proportional representa­
tion (Proporz) contributes to 
the peaceful living together
86 54 81
European integration renders 
the proportional representation 
superfluous
30 81 34
The political autonomy benefits 
also the Italians in South Tyrol
92 77 93
Sources: 1991: ASTAT-Survey, as quoted by Zappe 1996, p. 115; 1997: Social Survey 1997, 
ASTAT 2000, p. 79. IN both cases, representative population surveys have been carried out.
Today, all three ethnic-linguistic groups in South Tyrol can be rather sure that their 
fundamental economic, social and cultural rights are respected. A major factor con­
tributed to this positive situation are also two political developments of the last dec­
ades: The increasing readiness of the Italian governments, to grant more autonomy 
to its regions; and the integration of Europe wherein Italy has played an active role 
since the beginning. It is unconceivable that a member state of the European Union 
would withhold fundamental socio-economic and cultural rights from one of its 
national minorities. Thus, the central issues facing South Tyrol in the 21st century 
will be quite different from those it faced in the Twentieth Century. They will relate 
to problems which are relevant for many other advanced Western societies: How to 
face the fertility decline and the rising proportions of old-aged people; how to cope 
with the necessary immigration and the integration of immigrants; how to preserve
the environment and landscape in one of the prime tourist regions in Europe, which 
is endangered severely by massive transit traffic; but, finally, also how tostrengthen 
democratic participation within the autonomous province, given the vast political 
competencies and financial means the province now has at its disposal.
Max Haller
Südtirol -  Eine ökonomische oder politische Erfolgsstory?
Es scheint offenkundig zu sein, dass ethnisch-nationale Konflikte mit der wirt­
schaftlichen Lage einer Minderheit Zusammenhängen und stärker werden, wenn 
es ihr wirtschaftlich schlecht geht. Die Entwicklung in Südtirol scheint diese These 
deutlich zu belegen: Die Konflikte brachen aus in den 60er und 70er Jahren, als 
noch Tausende von deutschsprachigen Südtirolern auswanderten; die Situation 
beruhigte sich jedoch gegen Ende des Jahrhunderts, als die wirtschaftliche Situ­
ation immer besser wurde. Trotzdem zeigt die Geschichte, dass gesellschaftli­
che Konflikte oft nicht in Phasen des wirtschaftlichen Niedergangs, sondern des 
Wachstums ausbrechen, oder dass nicht wirtschaftlich benachteiligte, sondern 
starke Regionen um mehr Autonomie kämpfen. Der Beitrag versucht zu belegen, 
dass auch in Südtirol neben dem Wirtschaftswachstum andere Faktoren wichtig 
waren und dazu beitrugen, dass sich das Land zu einem Modellfall für die erfolg­
reiche Lösung eines interethnischen Konfliktes entwickeln konnte.
Im Einzelnen werden die folgenden Hypothesen entwickelt und mit empirischem 
Material belegt: (1) Ethnische Spannungen werden besonders dann stark, wenn 
sich eine Tendenz zur Herausbildung einer „konsolidierten Sozialstruktur“ zeigt, 
d.h„ die Minderheiten in mehreren Merkmalen (wirtschaftlich, beruflich, sprach­
lich, religiös) von der Mehrheit differenziert sind; dies war in der Nachkriegszeit 
viel stärker der Fall als später. (2) Die Anerkennung der deutschsprachigen Min­
derheit durch den Staat Italien wurde erst im Laufe der Jahrzehnte erreicht; spä­
ter geriet allerdings die italienische Sprachgruppe innerhalb von Südtirol in eine 
Minderheitsposition, was seinerseits zu neuen Ängsten führte; in diesem Zusam­
menhang spielen auch herausragende politische Führer eine wichtige Rolle; behan­
delt wird jene von Alcide Degasperi und Silvius Magnago, wobei der erstere eher 
eine negative, der letztere eine wichtige positive Rolle spielte. (3) Die kulturelle 
Distanz bzw. Nähe zwischen Mehrheit und Minderheit ist wichtig; im Falle Südti­
rols stellte der Katholizismus eine gemeinsame Basis dar. (4) Die starke politische 
Zentralisierung Italiens in der Nachkriegszeit erschwerte die Lösung des Konflikts, 
Schritte zur Regionalisierung reduzierten dieses Problem, ebenso wie die frühe 
Einbindung Italiens in den Prozess der europäischen Integration. (5) Die friedliche 
Lösung des Konflikts förderte ihrerseits das Vertrauen zwischen den Volksgrup­
pen, Wirtschaftswachstum und soziale Integration.
Max Haller
Alto Adige-Südtirol: una “storia vincente” 
economica o política?
Sembra un’idea abbastanza diffusa che i conflitti etnico-nazionali siano in reJa- 
zione con la situazione economica di una minoranza e che essi si inaspriscano se 
quest’ultima è económicamente in crisi. Gli sviluppi della situazione sudtirolese 
sembrano confermare questa tesi: i conflitti esplosero negli anni Sessanta e Set- 
tanta, quando ancora migliaia di sudtirolesi erano costretti ad emigrare; la tensione 
è andata attenuandosi verso la fine del secolo, in corrispondenza al progressivo 
miglioramento della situazione economica.
Tuttavia la storia dimostra che i conflitti sociali esplodono spesso non in fasi di 
depressione economica bensi in quelle di crescita; essa mostra anche che non sono 
le regioni svantaggiate bensi quelle forti económicamente a combattere per una 
maggiore autonomia. II contributo cerca di dimostrare che anche in Sudtirolo, 
accanto alia crescita economica, vi furono altri importanti fattori che contribui- 
rono a fare di questa provincia un caso esemplare di soluzione di un conflitto inter- 
etnico.
In particolare vengono sviluppate le seguenti ipotesi, sostenute con materiale 
empírico:
1) Le tensioni etniche si acuiscono quando si rivela una tendenza alia genesi di 
una “struttura sociale consolidata”, cioé quando le minoranze sono differen- 
ziate dalla maggioranza sotto vari aspetti (economico, lavorativo, lingüístico, 
religioso); ció si adatta alia situazione del dopoguerra molto piú che a quella 
successiva.
2) II riconoscimento della minoranza di lingua tedesca da parte dello Stato italiano 
fu raggiunto solo nel corso dei decenni; in seguito il gruppo linguistico italiano 
si vide collocato in una posizione di “minoranza” alTinterno della provincia, 
cosa che da parte sua portó a nuove paure; in questo contesto un ruolo impor­
tante fu svolto anche da leaders politici di particolare rilievo; viene affrontato
il ruolo di Alcide De Gasperi e Silvius Magnago, di cui cui il primo è giudicato 
negativo e il secondo positivo.
3) E’ importante la distanza o vicinanza culturale tra maggioranza e minoranza: 
nel caso dell’Alto Adige-Südtirol il cattolicesimo rappresentó una base comune.
4) II forte centralismo che caratterizzó la politica italiana nel dopoguerra rese piú 
difficile la soluzione del conflitto, mentre i passi verso il decentramento ridus- 
sero il problema, cosi come la precoce partecipazione dell’Italia al processo di 
integrazione europea.
5) La soluzione pacifica del conflitto favor! dal canto suo la fiducia tra i gruppi 
etnici, la crescita economica e I’integrazione sociale.
Notes
1 A first version of this contribution was presented as a lecture at the Summer Academy 2001  
“Regions and Minorities in a Greater Europe”, European Academy Bolzano/Bozen, September 14, 
2001 .
2 As at least a partial proof for this far-reaching hypothesis, we need only consider the fact that the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia (and of Czechoslovakia in the same vein) has not been the aim of the 
Slovene and Croatian leaders from the beginning. It was only a consequence of the repression of the 
Kosovo and the continous attempts at undermining the federal system and the rights of the single 
states by the regime of Milosevic, that Slovenia and Croatia turned toward the separation from the 
state of Yugoslavia.
3 One of the few persons it mentioned to my knowledge was Alexander Langer in a lecture given at 
the University of Graz in the early Nineties.
4 Roman Catholicism, in this regard, may be placed today somewhere in the middle between Bud­
dhism which is favouring mostly a peaceful settlement of conflicts, and modern Islam, which in its 
extreme variants still tends toward aggressiveness.
5 It is well known, that in the case of France this tendency led to the extinction of most local lan­
guages which were used in its territory a few centuries ago.
6 This fact can be observed in all regions of the world where long-lasting, bloody ethnic-national 
conflicts exist, such as in Northern Ireland, the Basque region, Palestine etc. In all these conflicts 
and regions, the majority of the population is strongly in favour of ending the conflict and finding 
a peaceful solution, but the active “fighters” for the minority, its independence etc. have developed 
vested interests in a continuation of the violent conflict which provides them with material, factual 
and symbolic prestige and power.
7 Ln this overview, I rely strongly on a new, very informative diploma thesis at the University of Inns­
bruck, written by the South Tyrolean Raimund Obkircher (supervisor: Gunther Pallaver) with the 
title “Ethnic tensions and socioeconomic situation in South Tyrol 1945-1999” (in German).
8 I rely here on the works of Obkircher (1999, pp. 144fF.), Steininger (1999), Widmann (1998), 
Steurer (1998), Zappe (1996).
9 Among the most important of the technical means in agriculture was the introduction of the mow­
ers (Mähmaschinen) which relieved farmers of one of their most heavy work and made this work 
much more efficient. A corollary of this was the increasing specialization of the farmers on specific 
products (e.g., diary products, or vegetables etc.); this also reduced the need for manpower. Today, 
for instance, practically no wine or fruit farmer in the Southern regions of South Tyrol has cows 
so that his work can be done only by use of machines and -  in times of harvesty -  foreign workers 
hired for a restricted period of time.
10 Half of them, however, later came back -  due both to an increasing prosperity of the South Tyrolean 
economy, and a decreasing labour demand in the German-speaking countries.
11 This parole was invented by the highly respected Monsignore Michael Gamper, one of the leading 
fighters against fascism and its policy of italianizing the territorium of South Tyrol by forcing the 
native German-speaking population to emigrate to other parts of Hitler’s German Reich.
12 The first was that achieved by Gruber-Degasperi in 1946 which granted autonomy only to the 
region Trento-Bozen/Bolzano as a whole.
13 This thesis is proven by the fact that the financial transfers from the state and state-controlled 
incomes (such as customs duties) going to the province of South Tyrol are considerably larger than 
the transfers from the province (coming from taxes) to the state. This is a situation of net privilege 
of this region!
14 Due to the fact, that in the population censuses since 1981 the belonging to an ethnic-linguistic group 
is only collected separately from all other data, it is not more possible to compare the distributions of 
the two groups in occupational terms. We have to rely, for the later decades, on special surveys.
15 In the last decades of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, it was often said that the person of the 
old monarch, Kaiser Franz Joseph I, was one of the m ost decisive factors securing the unity of 
this highly complex and internally differentiated political empire. The tragedy was that this highly 
respected status of the monarch was due, not in the last instance, to his abstention from taking any 
open political stance, and in particular for his failure to find a new balance between the three large
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ethnic-national groups of the Germans, the Hungarians and the newly forming Slavic groups and 
countries within his empire.
16 In this regard, Degasperi’s attitudes and actions exhibit an astonishing similarity with that of 
another central figure in European postwar politics, the German chancellor Konrad Adenauer. 
Also this personality, whose merits are outside doubt, often took a rather ambivalent position when 
issues of internal democracy where at stake; also his government enacted laws against communists 
which were hardlv compatible with democratic principles.
17 The population of the province of Trento was rather loyal to the Habsburg dynasty, as was Degas- 
peri himself for some time!
18 Germany, the country where were Hitler and his National Socialism the most terrible fascist regime 
came to power, is divided between Catholicism and Protestantism. Yet, Hitler himself as well as 
some of his closest personal co-fighters (Goring, Gobbels etc.) came from an Austrian-South Ger­
man catholic background. Moreover, German protestantism in many regards still has elements of 
catholic ideology.
19 Again, the different stance of the simple clergy and the higher levels of catholic church in South 
Tyrol must be recognised; while the latter were quite ambivalent in their stance toward fascism and 
his suppression of German culture in Alto Adige, most of the lower clergy, the simple priests in the 
many small parishes, supported the resistance against it.
20 See, for instance, ASTAT 1999, Statistisches fahrbuch für Südtirol 1999, p. 92ff.
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